Order Without Command? Reevaluating the Use of the Imperatival Participle in 1 Peter
1Pet. 1:14[1] wJß te÷kna uJpakohvß mh\ suschmatizo/menoi tai√ß pro/teron
e˙n thØv aÓgnoi÷aˆ uJmw◊n e˙piqumi÷aiß
Translation: “As obedient children, do not be conformed to those desires
[you held] in your former ignorance.
1Pet. 2:18 π Oi˚ oi˙ke÷tai uJpotasso/menoi e˙n panti« fo/bwˆ toi√ß
despo/taiß, ouj mo/non toi√ß aÓgaqoi√ß kai« e˙pieike÷sin aÓlla» kai« toi√ß
skolioiç.
Translation: “Servants, be subject with every reverence to your masters, not only to those
who are good, and gentle, but also to those who are crooked.”
1Pet. 3:1-2 π ÔOmoi÷wß [ai˚] gunai√keß, uJpotasso/menai toi√ß i˙di÷oiß aÓndra¿sin, iºna kai« ei¶ tineß
aÓpeiqouvsin twˆ◊ lo/gwˆ, dia» thvß tw◊n gunaikw◊n aÓnastrofhvß a‡neu lo/gou
kerdhqh/sontai, e˙popteu/santeß th\n e˙n fo/bwˆ aJgnh\n aÓnastrofh\n uJmw◊n.
Translation: Similarly, wives, subject yourselves to your husbands, in order that also if some of
them may disbelieve the word, through conduct of their wives—without word—they
shall benefit, seeing your pure and reverent conduct.
In her commentary on 1 Peter, Karen Jobes insightfully
remarks that Peter “points to the slave, who was most vulnerable in Greco-Roman
society, as a paradigm for the Christian believer who follows Jesus Christ.”[2] Thus
the command to “submit to your masters” is an injunction whose inner logic is
Christological, translated into the sphere of the mundane. We are not here to take issue with her idea
but to note a semantic oddity contained within this exegetical observation: if
the slave is indeed serving as such a paradigm, it immediately becomes
significant to note Peter’s commands are here conveyed both through a finite imperative, as well as through an “imperatival participle.”[3] Thus
the question must be: what force does such a use of the participle have?[4] This is not isolated to the case of the
slave; Betsy Bauman-Martin claims to detect no less than twenty instances of
the imperatival participle (hereafter abbreviated IP) in 1 Peter alone.[5] This is undoubtedly an exaggeration, as the
very idea of an imperatival participle being a legitimate category is still
debated,[6]
and at the very least we have to agree with Daniel Wallace, who comments briefly
“The imperatival participle is quite rare.”[7] At any rate, it is not surprising that Travis
Williams opens his recent essay on the topic by noting that “one of the more
neglected, and therefore misunderstood, grammatical functions in the NT is the
imperatival participle.”[8]
Given the importance it has within Jobes’ view of the scope
of 1 Peter, it seems imperative (forgive the pun) to investigate such
matters. Though many commentators have
come to the conclusion that the IP is a “slightly softer” form of command than
the imperative,[9] it
will be argued here that this is not necessarily the case. Through
an investigation of its occurrences in 1 Peter, it will be argued that IP began
to run parallel to the imperative, and that unless specific evidence is given
otherwise, the force of a command given through an IP is equivalent—and indeed
interchangeable—with the finite imperative form. With that said, it will also be argued, that
it appears that the reason Peter does choose the IP in some cases, the finite
form in others, is that the IP indicates specific commands which relate to a
previously established general command, given by a finite form imperative. We will begin by investigating some of the
“softer imperative,” views and their arguments.
We will then turn to the use of IP in Koine Greek, and then specifically
to how it is used in 1 Peter, to determine exactly what its function is, and
why it would be chosen instead of just using the imperative form.
I. The
“Imperatival Participle”: Its Presence and Function.
What exactly is an IP? For our purposes, an IP may be defined as a
participle that 1) occurs where one would have expected a finite imperative, 2)
is grammatically independent of any other finite verb and 3) carries an
imperatival force.[10] It should be emphasized that this is a
specific function rather than form of
the participle, which is identical to normal participial occurrences.[11] For quite some time the very existence of
such a function was highly contentious, and experts were constantly at variance
with one another. Robertson formulated
the general rule that “it may be said that no participle should be explained in
this way that can properly be connected with a finite verb.”[12] While
Robertson’s rule certainly stands as a valid principle, today contemporary
scholars are a bit less hesitant at the category, however rare it is still
acknowledged to be. At the closing of a
lengthy and technical discussion of the occurrence of IP in Hellenistic and
Koine Greek texts, Porter gives a helpful summary:
While anacolouthon may serve as a possible [alternative]
explanation for some [of the instance of an IP], this is not convincing for
all. In fact, the terms of discussion
must be shifted. It has been established
that the independent Participle is an acceptable use of the Participle in
Greek. The question is not whether these
examples may qualify as such, but whether they pragmatically are used as
commands. Whereas pragmatic categories
by their very nature appear susceptible to endless dispute, there is nothing
grammatically which stands in the way of the commanding participle as a
description of one of the uses of the Participle in Greek.[13]
But if its presence has at least partially been settled as genuine, what then
of its function? Williams notes[14]
that David Daube was one of the first to investigate such usage, and was the
pioneer of the so-called “soft imperative” interpretation. Daube put forward the proposal that the Greek
usage was actually a latent and underlying Semitic influence, rather than an
idiomatic use original to Hellenistic Greek.[15] He writes: “the participle is in its place in
all admonitions to a proper conduct and even to a vast majority of fixed and
exact precepts; but not where a precept is an unqualified, hard ‘must’ or ‘must
not’ having absolutely nothing to do with custom.”[16] Which is to say the participle serves as a
softer form of imperative by denoting what “should” be done, rather than what
absolutely “must” be done.
In addition to this, Daube’s notes that the “softness”
involved is also related to custom—the use of IP indicates something that has
the force of a customary procedure whose “necessity” is implicit; whereas the
finite imperative acts more as a non-customary, external “must” foisted upon
the recipient by the authority giving the command. Thus Daube restricts the usage of IP to
several specific situations: For one, the IP is never “used in a command
addressed to a specific person on a specific occasion,” and “it cannot be
indiscriminately employed…for every kind of rule,” it is never found “in an absolute, unquestioned, or unquestionable law.”[17] In this Daube was followed by many
commentators. Balch for example,
explicitly cites Daube and notes, “The participle never attained the full
strength of an imperative, but rather had the character of describing what
should be.”[18]
Daube’s theory has several
weaknesses, however. As technology has
progressed it becomes easier to do simple searches, which collate examples
nearly instantaneously. When one does
this one runs into verses like 2 Corinthians 8:24 (th\n ou™n e¶ndeixin thvß aÓga¿phß uJmw◊n
kai« hJmw◊n kauch/sewß uJpe«r uJmw◊n ei˙ß aujtou\ß e˙ndeiknu/menoi ei˙ß pro/swpon tw◊n e˙kklhsiw◊n.) where the IP is actually
being used for a specific occasion, namely that Titus should be shown the
“proof” of the Corinthians love.
Moreover, as Salom points out (and we shall argue in more detail later
on), that semantically IP can carry
the same force as finite imperatives. He
notes that this is not the case in Tannaitic Hebrew, where the use of
participle as imperative can carry only a general or gnomic sense (as Daube
himself argues).[19] Moreover (and perhaps most damning of all) is
that Daube’s argument actually never demonstrates the connection between the
Petrine (or biblical) usage and the Tannaitic Hebrew. This type of dependence is difficult enough
to prove on its own, but one looks in vain for a line of thought which would
provide the connection. It is merely
assumed by Daube’s essay to be a possibility.
A similar alternative is proposed by
Lauri Thuren, though by a different avenue.
Here still the IP is a “softer” expression than a straightforward finite
imperative, but this is not because of a semitic dependence running beneath it,
but from the standpoint of Greek rhetoric that uses “ambiguous expressions,” to
communicate the imperatival core of a thought without sounding authoritative.[20] In part this interpretation is driven by what
Thuren sees as Peter’s navigation of two extreme reactions to social pressure
amongst Christians: on the one hand, he notes, there were those who simply
capitulated to such external pressures by genuflecting and assimilating into
the culture at large. On the other hand
were those who, far from quiescent, wanted to exact a violence-for-violence
countermeasure. Thuren argues that the
rhetorical ambiguity latent within the use of an IP instead of a finite
imperative reflects Peter’s concern to address both groups at once without
alienating either. The IP creates an
“environment,” or a “thought-world” that shapes attitude, rather than the
harshness of a straightforward command: “[Peter] challenges the interpreter to
make a choice between understanding them [the IP commands] as encouraging
utterances, which describe the addressees and their situations, or as
injunctions.”[21]
Whatever the initial appeal of this
interpretation, Williams puts it mildly when he notes that Thuren “has won very
few followers,” with his ideas.[22] This is because, as William astutely points
out, Thuren failed to account for what his theory would mean once it spilled
beyond the boundaries of 1 Peter as a general grammatical rule indexing the
possible usage of an IP. It is difficult
to argue, for example, that in Hebrews 13:5 (Afila¿rguroß oJ tro/poß, aÓrkou/menoi toi√ß
parouvsin. aujto\ß ga»r ei¶rhken: ouj mh/
se aÓnw◊ oujd∆ ouj mh/ se e˙gkatali÷pw,) that
said ambiguity actually exists, or if a similarly dual audience is being
addressed. Unfortunately, whatever its
creativity, Thuren’s theory appears to be a case of special pleading, as it is
hardly adequate for all—or even a majority—of instances.
II.
Biblical use of IP and Its Petrine Use
We have argued above that IP’s do
not seem to conform to the “softer imperative” theories. Neither their rhetorical ambiguity (Thuren)
nor a Semitic origin (Daube) seem plausible—indeed because scriptural uses themselves
appear to point to the fact that IP can have equivalent semantic force to
finite imperatives. If this is the case,
what—if anything—is the differences
between an IP and a finite imperative?
Williams notes that every commentator agrees that the use of an IP in
the stead of the finite imperative communicates something different than that which would have been communicated
via the finite form.[23] With what we have argued is the failure of
the “soft imperative” theories, the question remains: what is the distinction?
To a limited extent we have already
shown instances where what an IP denotes is semantically similar (possibly even
identical) with the finite form (2 Cor. 8:24, Hebrews 13:5). Searching further we can find several more
instances where this is so—in particular if we turn to Romans 12:9-19 we find a
litany of examples (in fact, there appear to be 17 different occurrences of an
IP in this short span of ten verses).
What is fascinating here is not just the myriad of participles with
imperative force. It is the fact that
Paul can so casually intermix finite imperatives with imperatival participles with
no apparent difference:
Rom. 12:9 π ÔH
aÓga¿ph aÓnupo/kritoß. aÓpostugouvnteß to\ ponhro/n, kollw¿menoi twˆ◊ aÓgaqwˆ◊,12:10 thØv filadelfi÷aˆ ei˙ß aÓllh/louß
filo/storgoi, thØv timhØv aÓllh/louß prohgou/menoi,12:11 thØv spoudhØv mh\ ojknhroi÷, twˆ◊ pneu/mati
ze÷onteß, twˆ◊ kuri÷wˆ douleu/onteß,12:12 thØv
e˙lpi÷di cai÷ronteß, thØv qli÷yei uJpome÷nonteß, thØv proseuchØv proskarterouvnteß,
12:13 tai√ß crei÷aiß tw◊n aJgi÷wn koinwnouvnteß,
th\n filoxeni÷an diw¿konteß. 12:14
eujlogei√te tou\ß diw¿kontaß [uJma◊ß], eujlogei√te kai« mh\ katara◊sqe. 12:15 cai÷rein meta» cairo/ntwn, klai÷ein meta»
klaio/ntwn. 12:16 to\
aujto\ ei˙ß aÓllh/louß fronouvnteß, mh\ ta» uJyhla» fronouvnteß aÓlla» toi√ß
tapeinoi√ß sunapago/menoi. mh\ gi÷nesqe fro/nimoi par∆ e˚autoi√ß. 12:17 mhdeni« kako\n aÓnti« kakouv aÓpodido/nteß,
pronoou/menoi kala» e˙nw¿pion pa¿ntwn aÓnqrw¿pwn: 12:18 ei˙ dunato\n to\ e˙x uJmw◊n, meta» pa¿ntwn
aÓnqrw¿pwn ei˙rhneu/onteß: 12:19 mh\
e˚autou\ß e˙kdikouvnteß, aÓgaphtoi÷, aÓlla» do/te to/pon thØv ojrghØv,
ge÷graptai ga¿r: e˙moi« e˙kdi÷khsiß, e˙gw»
aÓntapodw¿sw, le÷gei ku/rioß.
So for example Paul can, with a finite imperative, in 12:14
command his readers to bless those who persecute them (eujlogei√te
tou\ß diw¿kontaß [uJma◊ß]) immediately before he commanded
likewise that his readers should “participate in the needs of the saints” but
in this instance used an IP, koinwnouvnteß. They thus
appear to denote the same thing with no “softening” on the part of the IP. Moreover, there are instances where the IP is
coordinated paratactically with a finite imperative such as Rom. 12:19: “Do not
avenge yourselves (mh\ e˚autou\ß e˙kdikouvnteß) but leave room for God’s wrath (aÓlla»
do/te to/pon thØv ojrghØv).”
But if such is the tight
coordination in Paul, what—if anything—could be the difference that led Peter
to use several IP independently of the finite form? Again the “softening”
theory must be dismissed, if for no other reason than it leads to
absurdity. Williams puts it well:
The nature of the contexts within which the [Petrine]
exhortations are given and the response called for as a result of the
exhortation is exactly the same as that of the finite imperative. The participle is used, for example, to
direct the manner of living within the Christian community. Should we say that the Petrine author held
back in the area of conformity to previous lifestyles (1Pet. 1:14—participle)
but was stern when it came to being holy (1:15—finite form), loving one another
(1:22-finite form_ being subject to human institutions (2:13-finite form), and
being humbled before God (5:6—finite form)?[24]
So what is it then? It is our contention here that while the force of the command is no different,
Peter uses the IP to structurally
differentiate his points. It appears
in every instance that Peter uses a finite form of imperative first in close proximity to the use of
an IP, and the IP is usually a specific sub-point
of the general thesis predicated in the finite form. Let us walk through his uses to see how this
works out.
In chapter one we are perhaps
immediately presented with a counter to this thought where a potential IP
occurs before a finite imperative in 1:13: Dio\ aÓnazwsa¿menoi ta»ß ojsfu/aß thvß dianoi÷aß uJmw◊n
nh/fonteß telei÷wß e˙lpi÷sate e˙pi« th\n ferome÷nhn uJmi√n ca¿rin e˙n
aÓpokalu/yei ∆Ihsouv Cristouv. However we must here agree with Jobes[25]
who notes that this is probably an adverbial usage of the participle. However, after e˙lpi÷sate we get the IP mh\ suschmatizo/menoi. Thus in a
sense, if we can use an analogy, the finite imperative + IP is similar to
making a “list” in Greek using men…de…de…de.
“Hope in the grace coming to you
in the revelation of Jesus Christ. Like
obedient children, do not be conformed.” Thus these two create a more complete idea. By saying this we must immediately caveat
that the “list” idea is hardly as tight as a men…de construction, while simulatenously maintaining that the IP
is not a weaker command, but a command that is taking place within a broader
idea. Thus “do not be conformed” is part
of the larger idea “take hope” but not simply adjectivally, but rather as an additional command. At this point we
have to disagree with Achtemeier who wants to argue that mh\ suschmatizo/menoi does not have independent imperatival force from e˙lpi÷sate.[26] In our
opinion this seems to misconstrue how the IP functions—if the participle has imperatival
force, it has it of itself; if it is adjectivally modifying another verb, it
would seem necessary to say that it would only carry one of the usual adverbial
forces (cause, means, concession, purpose, etc…).
Moving on to 2:18 we find something
similar. Or so I will argue. First perhaps we should note alternative
interpretations. Peter Davids, for
example, takes what we here argue are IP as simply adjectivally modifying “be
subject” in 2:13.[27] While possible, it is unusual to assume
grammatical modification over such a large distance. Our theory appears, at least on this account,
more parsimonious, as an IP would be a self-standing imperative (hence the
distance is no problem) while still being connected as Davids wants, to 2:13,
(albeit in a different manner, namely not adjectivally, but as a more specific
command-idea taking place within a broader command-idea). For our part Williams agrees with this interpretation.[28] While
we must again emphasize that this is only a loose connection (thus showing the
limits of the men…de analogy) here we
have a general principle being elucidated by several finite imperatives (2:15
“subject yourselves,”…2:17 honor everyone, love the brotherhood, fear God,
honor the king…”) that then shifts into a very specific situation (ironically the exact opposite of how Daube’s
theory predicts IP to function): “Slaves, be
subject…”
This happens again in 3:1 where women are commanded with an
IP to “subject yourselves….” Here the IP
apparently is referring back to 2:13 and the finite imperative: “Be
subject…” So the list idea begins to
appear: the general idea is to subject ourselves to every human institution and
this itself has several general ideas (honor everyone, fear God, love the
brotherhood…); but when we get to specific situations, suddenly Peter has moved
from finite imperatives to IP with specific commands to slaves and women. Here, again, the difference does not seem to
be the force of the command; all of these appear to have the same imperatival drive. Rather the difference seems to be one of
specificity—i.e. general vs particular. This
continues in 3:7 with husbands: “Husbands, live with your wives with
consideration,” where the IP sunoikouvnteß
is used.
And again in 3:9, Peter has returned to speaking of a broader audience,
but when he begins to enumerate specific actions,
he returns to the IP construction, still apparently following the main idea of
the finite imperative “subject yourselves” back in chapter two: mh\ aÓpodido/nteß
kako\n aÓnti« kakouv h£ loidori÷an aÓnti« loidori÷aß, toujnanti÷on de« eujlogouvnteß o¢ti ei˙ß touvto
e˙klh/qhte iºna eujlogi÷an klhronomh/shte. When
we turn to chapter four, again a similar formula arises. In 4:7 two finite imperatives swfronh/sate and nh/yate
are used, enumerating general conditions. As a specific subset, however, the IP “have
fervent love” occurs in 4:8, and in 4:10 “serve!” (diakonouvnteß) occurs again as a specific idea (“just as each has been
gifted…”).
This usage does not, of course, stand as a general
principle. What we have argued for is
that grammatically, it is completely possible for an IP to have the equivalent
imperatival force of a finite form imperative.
We argued also that it appears the reason Peter occasionally chooses to
employ an IP instead of the finite form is that in his particular case, the IP form allows for a differentiation
between a general command (finite form) and specific application (IP).
Conclusion
We have argued that the imperatival
participle does not represent a weaker form of imperative; its commands and
expectations are nearly identical with its finite form imperatival
brethren. Nor do they serve as an “ambiguous”
rhetorical device allowing Peter to deftly navigate the sensibilities of two
diametrically differing reactions to outside oppression. Rather it has been argued that, much more
humbly, the imperatival participle is utilized by Peter to differentiate
general commands and specific instantiations of those general orders. So, where we are all to subject ourselves to
every human institution, slaves, specifically, should submit to their masters,
wives to their husbands, and husbands should live considerately with their
wives. What is not being argued is that this is a necessary distinction between the finite form of the imperative,
and its imperatival participle counterpart.
Rather it appears as a possible distinction,
one created by Peter by his specific employment of the different imperatives.
It is utilized by Peter casuistically, so
to speak, where general principles are then given specific instances.
[1] These three are translated at the outset to provide
initial examples, though we will also be looking at (and translating) other
occurrences of the imperatival participle in Peter and elsewhere in order to
approach a meaningful semantic understanding of such a use of the participle.
[2] Karen Jobes, 1
Peter (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2005), 180.
[3] David Daube, “Participle and Imperative in 1 Peter,”
in The First Epistle of St. Peter: The
Greek Text With Introduction, Notes, and Essays ed. E.G. Selwyn 2nd
ed (London: MacMillan, 1947), 467-488.
[4] It should be noted that Jobes is not herself convinced
that these are functionally imperatively, but thinks many of them are adverbial
(1 Peter, 110-111). This will receive more commentary below.
[5] Betsy Bauman-Martin, “Women on the Edge: New
Perspectives on Women in the Petrine Haustafeln,” in Journal of Biblical Literature 123 (2004): 253-279. These are: 1:13a, b, 14, 18, 22; 2:1, 4, 12, 18;
3:1, 6c, d, 7a, b, 9a, b, 16; 4:8, 10; 5:9.
We will not here fully agree with her list, though a specific refutation
of her arguments will not be our goal.
It should be noted as an example, though, her citation of 2:1 (Apoqe÷menoi) since it is connected by ou™n and so draws one back into Peter’s prior
thought, is not strictly speaking a “true” imperatival participle. This is the position also of Richard B.
Vinson, Richard F. Wilson, and Watson E. Mills 1 & 2 Peter, Jude (Georgia: Smith & Helwys, 2010), 89, who
notes because of the connector it should retain its participial nature in
translation.
[6] The nature of the debate is given in detail by Stanley
E. Porter, Verbal Aspect in the Greek of
the New Testament With Reference to Tense and Mood (New York: Peter Lang,
2003), 370-377.
[7] Daniel B. Wallace, Greek
Grammar Beyond the Basics: An Exegetical Syntax of the New Testament (Grand
Rapids: Zondervan, 1996), 650.
[8] Williams, “Reconsidering the Imperatival Participle,”
59.
[9] For example, Paul Achtemeier, 1 Peter: A Commentary on 1 Peter (Minneapolis: Fortress Press,
1996), 117-118; John Elliot, 1 Peter: A
New Translation With Introduction and Commentary (New York: Doubleday,
2000), 357-358; David L. Balch, Let Wives
Be Submissive: The Domestic Code in 1 Peter (California: Scholars Press,
1981), 97.
[10] Summary taken from Travis B. Williams “Reconsidering
the Imperatival Participle in 1 Peter,” Westminster
Theological Journal 73 (100): 59-78 (59).
[11] H. G. Meecham, “The Use of the Participle for the
Imperative in the New Testament,” Expository
Times 58 (1947): 207-208.
[12] A.T. Robertson,
A Grammar of the Greek New
Testament in Light of Historical Research (Nashville: Broadman, 1934), 1134
[13] Porter, Verbal
Aspect, 376.
[14] Williams, “Reconsidering the Imperatival Participle,”
60.
[15] Daube, “Participle and Imperative in 1 Peter.”
[18] Balch, Let Wives
Be Submissive, 97.
[19] A.P. Salom, “The Imperatival Use of the Participle in
the New Testament,” Australian Biblical
Review 11 (1963): 44.
[20] Lauri Thuren, The
Rhetorical Strategy of 1 Peter With Special Regards to Ambiguous Expressions (Finland:
Abo Academy Press, 1990).
[22] Williams, “Reconsidering the Imperatival Participle,”
63.
[23] Williams, “Reconsidering the Imperatival Participle,”
72.
[24] Williams “Reconsidering the Imperatival Participle,”
75.
[25] Jobes, 1 Peter, 110
[26] Achtemeier, A
Commentary on 1 Peter, 120.
[27] Peter Davids, The
First Epistle of Peter (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1990), 98.
[28] Williams, “Reconsidering the Imperatival Participle,”
75.
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