Evangelical Uses of the Trinity as an Archetype for Gender (Part Two): Person, Relation, Structure
Though
the numerical ordering of these issues is not meant to rank them necessarily in
terms of importance (as they are all interrelated and cannot be truly discrete
issues), nevertheless it could rightly be said that this is the most important
of the issues—a “first among equals” so to speak. We have previously stated that the core of
EFS is that the Son is eternally subordinate to the Father in function. By extension this claim, according to EFS
proponents, buttresses the idea that women should be subordinate to men. Though the argumentation is complex, the claim at least can be seen to be
relatively simple. It has an additional
element to it, however: the persons of the Trinity are distinguished precisely,
and only, by the authority structures that define their relations. The Father, for example, commands. This makes Him the Father. The Son, on the other hand, obeys. This makes Him identifiable as the Son. The EFS Complementarians are of one mind on
this, even if they emphasize it to various degrees. Thus, to make an analogy, when the church
confesses “one essence, three persons,” the “three persons” bit could be
glossed as: three functionally-differentiated authority relations. This probably will not make it into the
hymnals any time soon, but it does seem to be a fair summary of the EFS
creed. For persons to show up as
persons, the structural differentiation of authority-submission must always-already be present.[1] Relations are actually a function of
differentiated power structure. Wayne
Grudem in particular notes that this stands at the very heart of his
Trinitarian theology: “Authority and submission between the Father and the
Son…and the Holy Spirit…is the
fundamental difference between the persons of the Trinity.” And conversely:
“If we did not have such differences
in authority in the relationships among the members of the Trinity, then we
would not know of any differences at all.”[2] There is for Grudem nothing more important, and this is not an overstatement of his
position, he writes: “it is the most
fundamental aspect of interpersonal relationships in the entire universe.”[3]
This
in turn leads to several distinctive theological moves. The first, which we will only briefly
mention, is that provides Grudem with (at least theoretically) a solution of how to differentiate yet unite the
persons once he drops the eternal generation of the son as unbiblical. In brief, eternal generation as understood by
say, Athanasius, the Cappadocians, or Augustine, both allowed an identity of nature as the Father generates a
consubstantial (homoousios) son, and it also ensured that the Father and
Son (and Holy Spirit) would not collapse into each other in modalism.[4] Athanasius argues, for example, that that
which is homoousios must be at least
in some sense two, or else the co- in consubstantial (to transfer the argument
into English) would not make any sense.[5] One can see then why Grudem stresses as he
does how utterly and unequivocally vital EFS is—without it the best case
scenario would then be modalism, if not just plain monism.
Two,
this leads to the equal yet opposite charge of modalism against the
egalitarians. So Robert Letham: “if the
Son is not eternally [functionally] subordinated to the Father, we are left
with modalism.”[6] And so: “With a feminized doctrine of God…a
thoroughgoing homogenization of the persons in fully mutual relations is the
overpowering tendency.”[7] By extension similar charges then move into
the human realm: Egalitarians homogenize the differences between sexes
precisely by undoing the power-structures which allow relational distinctions
to exist at all.[8] This is, as one may have predicted, also a
key moment when the two sides start talking past one another.
The
Egalitarians, of course, do not accept that relational distinctions must per necessity presuppose hierarchical
power arrangements. Thus the charge that
they are modalists, or erase gender distinctions, seems less of a charge, and
more of an imposition of an alien framework. At this point too, I think Giles
is right to point out a notable lacuna in the EFS position.[9] On the one hand, the EFS apologists are
constantly reaffirming that what they are doing is nothing new, but fully in
line with the tradition of Trinitarian orthodoxy, from Athanasius, to
Augustine, to Calvin, et al. Yet it is
precisely at this point that Grudem and others explicitly drop the eternal generation of the son, which was how the tradition
itself held in tension the identity and distinction of persons. Of course the argument can (and is) made that
if a tradition is not explicitly supported by scripture, so much the worse for
tradition. This is an important
discussion that needs to be had. But
Grudem at this point does not seem to realize the inconsistency of his claims
that he is simultaneously impeccably “orthodox” (i.e. traditional) and biblical in his affirmation of EFS
when he is using it as a substitute
for eternal generation. Even if the tradition could be shown to
affirm something like EFS (and this itself is hard enough to maintain) once EFS
substitutes for eternal generation, it must mean something entirely different
than the tradition could have ever meant it.
[1] I’m still baffled at how this could possibly be
true. I would love to ask Grudem how he
then deals with relations of friendship.
Do they dissolve difference? What
about pure Democracies? Playing the “friendship” card is not just a random
cheap shot—the concept of friendship, for example, is a key metaphor for Thomas
Aquinas’ doctrine of the Trinity. C.f.
Matthew Levering, “Friendship and Trinitarian Theology—A Response to Karen Kilby,”
in Internation Journal of Systematic
Theology vol 9 no. 1 (2007): 39-54.
[2] Grudem, Evangelical
Feminism, 433.
[3] Ibid., 429.
[4] C.f. Keith Johnson, “Augustine, Eternal Generation,
and Evangelical Trinitarianism,” Trinity
Journal 32 (2011): 141-163.
[5] C.f. the summary in J.N.D. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines 5th ed. (London: Adam and
Charles Black, 1977), 254.
[6] Robert Letham, “The Man-Woman Debate: Theological
Comment,” Westminster Theological Journal,
52 (1990): 69.
[7] Letham, The Holy
Trinity, 392.
[9] Giles, The
Eternal Generation of the Son, 220-236.


Comments
Just a comment to say thanks for this summary! Grudem has some serious issues at this point. One of the issues he doesn't see with ascribing authority as the point of differentiation between the persons of the Trinity is that he takes an essential attribute of God and "breaks it up" between the persons of the Trinity. Thus, he takes an attribute of God and ties it to the persons of the Godhead. Major problems with that.
Anyhow - found your post here doing some research on Eternal Generation - very helpful!
I hope you're well.
~Jacob Young