Aquinas on the Simplicity of God
The following is an excerpt from a small reflection essay for my Medieval theology course tomorrow. We each were assigned aspects of Thomas Aquinas' theology, and I got Divine Simplicity. Enjoy!
Simplicity, if misconstrued, can become a fairly ironic
moniker for God. In the introduction to
his beautiful biography of Thomas Aquinas, G. K. Chesterton wrote, reminiscing
that “A lady I knew picked up a book of selections from St. Thomas, with a
commentary; and began hopefully to read a section with the innocent heading, The Simplicity of God. She then laid the book down with a sigh and
said: ‘Well, if that’s His simplicity, I wonder what His complexity is like.’”[1]
Simplicity
is the doctrine that there is, roughly speaking, no composition of any kind in
God. He is not made up of more basic
“bits,” nor is he an amalgamation of parts, nor can he be divided, nor is he
made up of matter at all. At first blush
this doctrine seems esoteric and abstruse, a ghost or relic wandering the arid
scholastic wastes. Indeed it has always
had a litany of critics. In our own
century it has fallen by the wayside.
Particularly acidic are the comments of Emil Brunner and Karl
Barth. Says Brunner, “Anyone who knows
the history of the development of the doctrine of God in ‘Christian’
theology…will never cease to marvel at the unthinking way in which theologians
adopted the postulates of philosophical speculation…and at the amount of harm this
has done the ‘Christian’ doctrine of God,”; and perhaps even harsher though
less verbose, Barth in
his Dogmatics claimed that Simplicity “was
... exalted to the all-controlling principle, the idol ... devouring everything
concrete.”[2]
On inspection, however, it would be
difficult (or, impossible) to accuse Aquinas of merely applying simplicity
“unthinkingly,” though without the pejorative connotations Barth seems at least
partially correct that it could indeed be seen as a controlling principle in
Aquinas’ thought. In fact Jay Wesley
Richards notes that along the course of Aquinas’ thought Simplicity pushes
further and further toward the front of his works, until it receives its final
position front and center at the beginning of Q. 3 in the prima pars of the Summa
Theologia, suggesting perhaps that the more he thought about it, the more
Aquinas considered it of the utmost importance.[3]
Simplicity should not be considered
as merely one among the many attributes of God, however. Having established the plausibility of God’s
existence, at the beginning of Q.3 Aquinas notes “now it can be shown how God
is not, by denying of Him whatever is unfitting to Him—namely composition,
motion, and the like. Thereby we must discuss
His simplicity, whereby we deny composition in Him…” Thus David Burrell notes that Simplicity, far
from being an attribute, acts more
like a “formal feature,” of divinity, in which it actually defines the manner in which properties may be spoken of God.”[4] Thus we might say Simplicity is both a matter
of ontology and epistemology. It is a diagnostic tool that aids us in
answering “what is God?” (a question Chesterton records that a young Aquinas
was famous for pestering his professors with) and “what is it to speak and know
God?”
Brunner’s additional comment that
simplicity is merely a (fallacious) importation from philosophy as an
encroachment into properly “biblical,” theology, could hardly be further from
the truth, and he probably couldn’t have gotten away with such a statement
except that it reflected the general prejudice of his age regarding metaphysics. Here the pejorative connotation contained in
Barth’s “all controlling principle,” breaks down as well. For Aquinas the discussion on simplicity,
while of course employing philosophy, is never an a priori deductive axiom foisted upon scripture like an iron cage,
but is primarily a device to properly interpret scripture itself.
Before getting into the bulk of his
arguments we immediately get a sense of simplicity as a hermeneutical tool for
statements about God in the very first article in III. He asks: “Whether God is a body?” and the
five points of evidence for God having a body are scriptural: God is spoken of
as three dimensional (higher than heaven, deeper than hell, etc…); everything
that has a figure is a body, and it seems since man was made in God’s image, He must have a figure and ergo a
body; whatever is corporeal is or has a body, and God is said to have arms,
eyes, right hand, etc…; posture belongs to a body alone, yet Isaiah said he saw
the Lord sitting…; only bodies can be referenced by local terms, and we are
exhorted to “come to the Lord,” et al.
And while Aquinas’ answers are philosophical, we are here dealing with a
very pertinent interpretive issue on how literal to take these descriptors.[5]
He answers: on the contrary, God is
Spirit. So automatically the
introduction into the discussion on Simplicity isn’t about the mere
introduction of an alien principle, but arrives as a heuristic which is
implicitly guiding us to organize which scriptures interpret which. Because it is not immediately obvious that
“spirit” means “not a body,” in this sense.
Aquinas continues in the first and second replies (which are largely
parallel) that God cannot be a body because “no body is in motion unless it be
put in motion,” and secondly “because the fist being must by necessity be in
act, and no way in potency,” but “every body is a potency, [per the first reply
that every body moves only when put in motion]” thus God cannot be a body. And Aquinas replies to the various scriptures
by noting “Holy Writ puts before us spiritual and divine things under the
likenesses of corporeal things. Hence
when it attributes to God the three dimensions…it designates His virtual
quantity [i.e. His power, excellence, majesty, etc…].”
Aquinas goes on in article two of
question 3 to investigate whether then God is a composite of “matter and
form.” Here there are some interesting
observations. Aquinas answers that God
cannot be such a composition because “everything composed of matter and form is
good through its form,” but God is not good through
anything but is Himself the
GOOD. “Hence it is impossible that God
is matter and form.” Yet this does not leave God “amorphous,”
so to speak, Aquinas makes an intriguing suggestion: Every agent acts by its
form, and its manner of form determines the type of agent it is. God is primarily and essentially an agent as actus purus and is thus in His essence a Form,[6] and not a composite of
matter and form. Why? Because as we have seen for Aquinas matter is
inert; if God were composite there would be a “delay” in His absolute action
and God would be less Himself.
We can understand this better by
turning to the third article. “Whether
God is the Same as His Essence or Nature?”
Here it behooves us to quote Aquinas’ complex reasoning at length:
God is the same as His essence or
nature. To understand this, it must be
noted that in things composed of matter and form, the nature or essence must
differ from the suppositum [i.e. the material expression of the nature],
because the essence or nature comprises in itself only what is included in the definition of the species: as,
humanity comprises in itself all that is included in the definition of man…now
individual matter, with all its individualizing accidents, is not included in the definition of
species. One of the elements in this …is
that what is one and simple can be represented only by many things. And so there comes about in these effects
composition, which renders suppositum distinct from the nature in them. For this flesh, these bones, this blackness,
this whiteness, etc…are not included in the definition of a man. Therefore this flesh, these bones and
accidents designating this matter, are not included in humanity.
This is what Rudi Te Veld calls the
principle of the “non-identity”[7] which runs through every
created, composite thing. You and I do
not “express,” or “enact” ourselves purely, because our composite form allows
the accumulation of accidents which “delay” and hide any “pure” expression of
who were are (thus for example a stutter while proclaiming your love to someone
can ruin the message and dilute the purity of self-expression, etc..) In other
words who we are is always expressed through a medium not strictly part of the
definition of ourselves (I am not my bones, in Aquinas’ language) and in so
doing an interval of “not myself,” piggybacks upon every self-expression.
Moreover as we are a composite of matter and form in order to “explain,” and “identify,”
ourselves we have to take a conceptual step back in order to identify our
constituent parts: thus in a sense who were are has to be reduced to the more
basic parts of our composition.
“Whatever a thing has besides its essence must be caused either by the
principles of that essence…or by some exterior agent—as heat is caused in water
by fire…therefore a thing whos being differs from its essence must have its
being caused by another.” (I.Q3.a4) But
this is not so with God; without composition, God is the explanation for God,
and God is the expression for God. God
expresses God purely, without the delay of a filter or medium.
Moreover, Aquinas continues in
article 5, God cannot be complex because God is not a genus. That is to say there
is no genus “Divinity,” of which God
is merely an example. This is because
“in the intellect, genus is prior to what it contains, but nothing is prior to
God either really or in the intellect.
Therefore God is not in any genus.”
If there was a genus
“Divinity,” God would fall under the principle of “non-identity” we just
encountered: for if he were merely an exemplar of the Genus there would have to
be some individuating principle the genus became composite with (be it matter,
or whatever) that specified and located God as an species apart from the
universality of the Genus. But in doing
so God becomes not only composite but an impure expression of Himself and,
given the “Five Ways” of Aquinas, where God must be the self-existent
beginning, not God at all, in fact.
Rather “God is the principle of all being, therefore He is not contained
in any genus as its principle.”
By the same reasoning there can be
no “accidents” (i.e. non-essential) qualities in God, because all subjects
prone to accidents relate to them as potency relates to act. What Aquinas means by this is that our
identities are in a real way bound up within the accidents of our life (again
we go back to we can have no “pure” expression of ourselves unmediated by
accidents). But there can be no potency
in God, and therefore no accidents (I.Q3.a.6).
In article 8 Aquinas summarizes his
previous arguments and adds a few (semi-)new ones which appear as elaborations
on previously established principles.
For example, every composite-entity is posterior to its constituent
composition, but again God does not “come-after” anything, and thus cannot be
composite. Or further, in every
composite entity there is a previous cause which must account for the unity of
the composition, for “parts cannot unite unless something causes them to
unite.” But God cannot have a cause per definition since He is the first efficient
cause.
Aquinas ends his specific enquiry
into simplicity with article eight: whether
God can enter into composition with composite things? Aquinas, predictably, answers no for three
principle reasons. The first, he says,
God is the first efficient cause, and thus cannot enter into composition
because “matter can be neither numerically nor specifically identical with an
efficient cause.” Secondly, akin to
earlier arguments, God cannot enter into composition “because, since God is the
first efficient cause, to act belongs to Him primarily and essentially. But that which enters into composition with
anything does not act primarily and essentially, but rather the composite so
acts; for the hand does not act, but the man by his hand…Hence God cannot be
part of a composite.” And thirdly
because “no part of a composite can be absolutely first among beings…for matter
is in potency, and potency is absolutely posterior to act…and as that which
participates is posterior to that which is essential, so likewise is that which
is participated…”
Thus in conclusion we can see how
Thomas is utilizing both an ontological, and a hermeneutical or epistemological
tool with simplicity. Bruce Marshall
writes of Thomas “When applied to God, ‘simple’ is not primarily a metaphysical
description…but rather a metalinguistic stipulation rooted in the conviction of
God’s transcendence. It serves to
qualify the application of all creaturely discourse to God, who is, so the
faith maintains, the beginning and end of all creatures, but not himself a
creature.”[8] To summarize and conclude I quote at length
an excellent illustration by William Placher:
I might for instance, ordinarily
think about something by distinguishing its component parts. A carburetor has a tube through which air
flows, and a jet that sprays fuel into it.
But God, as simple, has no component parts, so we cannot understand God
in that way. Again I might understand
the carburetor in terms of its form and matter: take some tempered steel and
shape it into a large tube with a small jet entering it. But, Aquinas says, God is not composed of
form and matter, since God is not a material body, so we cannot use such
distinctions to understand God. I might
think about my carburetor in terms of potency and act—that is, I might say
something like “Here is how you make a carburetor, and then, when you pump fuel
and air through it, here is what it does.”
But divine simplicity, Aquinas says, does not admit of potency, so that
distinction is likewise of no use. Yet
again if we had a carburetor on the table in front of us and I were trying to
explain it to you, you might ask about some piece sticking out of the top, and
Id reply, “Oh that must be how it fastens to the rest of the engine. That doesn’t really have anything to do with
being a carburetor.” In other words, I
would distinguish its essence from something distinct from that essence. But this also does not work with respect to
God, who has no properties distinct from the divine essence. The list goes on. It seems that none of the ways we would
orindarily go about understanding something work with respect to God…A decade
or so before the Summa, Aquinas
covered much the same ground in his Disputed
Questions on the Power of God, and concluded, “Wherefore man reaches the
highest point of his knowledge about God when he knows that he knows him not,
inasmuch as he knows that that which God is transends whatsoever he conceives of
Him.” (On the Power of God 7.5 ad.
14.)[9]
[1] G.K. Chesterton, Saint
Thomas Aquinas: The Dumb Ox (New York: DoubleDay, 1956) p.xvi.
[2] Emil Brunner, Dogmatics
Vol. 1: The Doctrine of God (London: Lutterworth, ,1949) p.242; Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics II/1 p.329.
[3] Jay Wesley Richards, The Untamed God: A Philosophical Exploration of Divine Perfection, Simplicity,
and Immutability (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2003) p.214n.5.
[4] David Burrell, “Distinguishing God from the World,” in
Language, Meaning, and God, ed. Brian
Davies, (London, Geoffery Chapman, 1987) p.75.
[5] This issue especially may seem absurd to most
Christians as its not usually an issue of contention. What is missed in this dismissal is how it
relates to the concept of impassibility; namely that if God is not impassible,
then logically it seems to demand that God in some sense have a body or
corporeality in order to be receptive.
Modern passiblists like Moltmann, Jüngel, and others, have not taken
their position to this conclusion, though in some sense Hartshorne definitely
has (though “body” is termed in the sense that all bodies are composites of
actual occasions, and God is merely a huge cluster of families of actual
occasions). However the Open-Theist
Clark Pinnock has suggested it in his own work, seemingly taking the exact opposite stance of Aquinas:
“There is an issue that has not been raised yet in the
discussion around the open view of God.
If He is with us in the world, if we are to take biblical metaphors
seriously, (!) is God in some sense embodied?
Critics will be quick to say that though there are expressions of this idea
in the bible, we shouldn’t take them literally.
But I do not believe that the idea is as foreign to the Bible’s view of
God as we have assumed. In tradition,
God is thought to function primarily as a disembodied spirit, but this is
scarcely a biblical idea. For example
Israel is called to hear God’s word, to gaze on his glory and beauty. Human beings are said to be embodied
creatures created in the image of God.
Is there perhaps something in God which corresponds to embodiment? Having a body is certainly not a negative
thing because it makes it possible for us to be agents. Perhaps God’s agency would be easier to
envisage if he were in some way corporeal.
(Pinnock, Most-Moved Mover
p.34)
[6] Karl Rahner complained in his book The Trinity trans. Joseph Donceel (New
York: Crossroads, 2004) p.15 that Aquinas has effectively castrated Trinitarian
theology by separating his treatise “on the one god,” from “on the triune God,”
thus making it seem that the Trinity is a mostly irrelevant add-on. But here with Aquinas’ language of pure form
is a suggestion that seems to be taken up later with the bridge between the
treatise that “God delights in Himself,” namely that the “pure form,” or the actus purus of God is nothing other than
the inter-trinitarian life of God-in-act.
[7] Rudi Te Veld, Aquinas
on God (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2006) p.79
[8] Bruce D. Marshall, “Aquinas as a Post-Liberal
Theologian,” The Thomist 53 (July
1989): 382
[9] William Placher, The
Domestication of Transcendence: How Modern Thinking About God Went Wrong
(Westminster: John Knox Press, 1996) p.22-23
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