Is Exegesis Without Presupposition Possible?
The concept of presuppositions and their role in hermeneutics and exegesis has become somewhat of a common fare in discussions on how to interpret the Bible, or any text for that matter. Rudolf Bultmann, one of the turn of the century theologians famous for pushing for the position that no, in fact it is impossible to do exegesis without presuppositions playing a part in how the text is interpreted (following to a large part Martin Heidegger and Wilhelm Dilthey before him), ironically has been misinterpreted in this aspect by popular appropriation--due no doubt to presuppositions regarding just what he meant. Many who misunderstand Bultmann take his "pre-understanding" or presupposition to prescribe answers (or questions) of an already determinate content in the sense of a prejudgment. But this is not necessarily the case. So what did Bultmann mean when he said exegesis without presuppositions was impossible?
According to Bultmann, the one who deals with a text deals with it essentially as a questioner ("The Problem of Hermeneutics" p.241) because the essential existential structure of man is questionableness. That is to say man as a being is an interpretive being who approaches the text only through the specific character of his existence's questionableness, which requires "the interpreter's relationship in his life to the essential content which is directly or indirectly expressed in the text" (p.241) But which content this is depends on the interest of the interpretation (e.g. sociological, aesthetic etc...) but the direction Bultmann takes it for its application to the New Testament is "an interest in history as the sphere of life in which human existence moves, in which it attains its possibilities and develops them." (p.253) As Pannenberg puts it: "[Bultmann] thinks of God, of whose actions the New Testament witnesses speak, only in connection with man, [and] only as the one who is asked about in the questionableness of human existence." (Basic Questions in Theology vol.1 p.108) In this way the pre-understanding of an exegetical inquiry into the New Testament consists really in "the inquiry into the understanding of human existence which finds expression in the Scriptures." ("The Problem of Hermeneutics" p.258) Thus, as Pannenberg notes: "the questioning without which the text could not be understood as an answer is the only presupposition of understanding." (BQT p.109)
In this sense the pre-understanding put forward by Bultmann did not mean explicitly the fore-closing of interpretive possibilities by a preconceived structure of definite content which would then limit textual interpretations by pushing them through certain narrow channels (though, implicitly this is a reduction that occurs by interpreting everything existentially). Rather the questioning character of existence attempts to make room for a revision of any given interpretation about the essential content of a text by means of a confrontation with the text itself. Hence in understanding Bultmann in this area we must distinguish between what Bultmann intended, and what he actually accomplished. For while he meant for the existential relation to the text to allow the text to open up in all of its possibilities through the constant questionability of the interpreters existence, in reality things only become meaningful as they relate to the existential possibility of the individual (or perhaps we should say everything becomes relevant, but only as an existential idea) and as such the interpretive possibilities do, in fact, become limited.
According to Bultmann, the one who deals with a text deals with it essentially as a questioner ("The Problem of Hermeneutics" p.241) because the essential existential structure of man is questionableness. That is to say man as a being is an interpretive being who approaches the text only through the specific character of his existence's questionableness, which requires "the interpreter's relationship in his life to the essential content which is directly or indirectly expressed in the text" (p.241) But which content this is depends on the interest of the interpretation (e.g. sociological, aesthetic etc...) but the direction Bultmann takes it for its application to the New Testament is "an interest in history as the sphere of life in which human existence moves, in which it attains its possibilities and develops them." (p.253) As Pannenberg puts it: "[Bultmann] thinks of God, of whose actions the New Testament witnesses speak, only in connection with man, [and] only as the one who is asked about in the questionableness of human existence." (Basic Questions in Theology vol.1 p.108) In this way the pre-understanding of an exegetical inquiry into the New Testament consists really in "the inquiry into the understanding of human existence which finds expression in the Scriptures." ("The Problem of Hermeneutics" p.258) Thus, as Pannenberg notes: "the questioning without which the text could not be understood as an answer is the only presupposition of understanding." (BQT p.109)
In this sense the pre-understanding put forward by Bultmann did not mean explicitly the fore-closing of interpretive possibilities by a preconceived structure of definite content which would then limit textual interpretations by pushing them through certain narrow channels (though, implicitly this is a reduction that occurs by interpreting everything existentially). Rather the questioning character of existence attempts to make room for a revision of any given interpretation about the essential content of a text by means of a confrontation with the text itself. Hence in understanding Bultmann in this area we must distinguish between what Bultmann intended, and what he actually accomplished. For while he meant for the existential relation to the text to allow the text to open up in all of its possibilities through the constant questionability of the interpreters existence, in reality things only become meaningful as they relate to the existential possibility of the individual (or perhaps we should say everything becomes relevant, but only as an existential idea) and as such the interpretive possibilities do, in fact, become limited.
Comments
I think there needs to be a definition regarding two types of assumptions though (obviously there could be more too, and even these two are not discrete and always overlap) that is between presuppositions of a general relation to the text that allows one to interpret it (e.g. what I was trying to show was Bultmann's attempted position of the existentialist relation to the text, even if this generally also turns into material control over the text) and assumptions of a definite presupposed material content (e.g. facts, propositions, specific understanding like the sky is blue, my name is Derrick, so on...).
Thanks for the comment!