Galileo Again: Reevaluating Galileo’s Conflict With the Church and Its Significance for Today (Part Four)


When the Inquisition—which, while we cannot go into it here, is also a much misunderstood and complex length of history[1]—could act and execute orders without the Pope knowing, this should also lead us to caution about speaking in broad terms of Galileo vs. “The Church” as if the latter were a homogenous institution.  While Galileo still had many supporters, his ego and temper made him quite good at alienating his other friends within the church as well.  Earlier in 1623 he published a work on comets attacking a lead Jesuit astronomer named Orazio Grazzi—calling him, among other things, a “fraud” a “simpleton” and accusing him of intellectual thievery, fundamentally alienating the powerful Jesuits who had until then remained on friendly terms with Galileo despite many disagreements.[2]  At this point in time, we might suspect, if one had alienated both the Pope and the Jesuits, one would be in a precarious situation.

To make matters worse, we must also understand that Galileo’s relationship to various factions within the church, including the Pope, was situated in the wider context of the Catholic church’s reaction to the Protestant Reformation.  To betray the Pope is never a good idea, but it is especially unwise in an environment in which the Church is on high alert and driven for political considerations into very conservative positions that just a hundred years earlier would have been considered extreme.  As historian Richard Blackwell aptly puts it:

If Copernicus’ book had been published either one hundred years earlier, or one hundred years later, the Galileo affair would probably not have happened.  But, in fact, it was published in 1543, when the Reformation was in full bloom, and the [Catholic] Counter Reformation was just beginning.  Hence it was by 1616 all of the actors and cultural forces were in place for the drama of the Galileo affair to begin.[3]

From its inception, Copernicanism had been paired with Protestantism because of its early acceptance and promotion among the theologians of Wittenberg.  Later Copernicanism as a revolution of worldview would be paralleled by the Reformers themselves as the necessary counterpart to their reform of the church (in fact, later polemic of science against Christianity is often merely secularized discourse borrowed from early Protestant polemics against Catholics).[4]  This goes a long way to explain the pushback against Galileo in the form of Biblical passages, but it also reveals how complex the situation was, and our inability to reduce it to simply two sides.

To demonstrate this let us play a brief game, where I will cite two passages, and you can guess to yourself which was written by Galileo, and which was written by Cardinal Bellarmine, who had the task of admonishing Galileo on behalf of the Inquisition in 1616:

1.) I say that if there were a true demonstration that the sun is at the center of the world and the earth in the third heaven, and that the sun does not circle the earth but the earth circles the sun, then one would have to proceed with great care in explaining the Scriptures that appear contrary, and say rather that we do not understand them than that what is demonstrated is false.

2.) In the learned books of worldly authors are contained some propositions about nature which are truly demonstrated., and others which are simply taught; in regard to the former [that which is demonstrated] the task of wise theologians is to show that they are not contrary to Holy Scripture; as for the latter (which are taught but not demonstrated with necessity), if they contain anything contrary to the Holy Writ, then they must be considered indubitably false and must be demonstrated such by every possible means.

Both statements appear to say that if heliocentrism could be demonstrated, then we would have to be cautious about our understanding of the meaning of scripture in those passages that appear to teach geocentrism.  On this they are united.  The second statement appears, however, slightly more reactionary: propositions taught but not demonstrated with certainty that conflict with scripture must be considered false and “demonstrated [false] by any means necessary.”  Since I told everyone up front this is a game, you might guess my trickery: Galileo’s is actually the second, more conservative sounding statement, while Bellarmine’s is the first, more “liberal” sounding![5]

Thus the complexity of the situation regarding reading scripture appears: both Bellarmine and Galileo are here embodying the ancient practice of reading scriptures according to principles of  “accommodation” that goes back to scripture itself. Many of us may not like the term “accommodation” because it sounds like we are compromising truth.  But in fact accommodation is an attempt precisely to preserve truth by understanding scripture’s meaning.  When, for example, we say we love the Lord our God with all of our “heart,” we do not thereby have to commit our anatomy textbooks to the flame when we learn contrary to some Hebrew concepts of anatomy the heart is not the literal seat of emotions.[6]  Or, when we say “the sun rises,” or “God’s strong arm,” we understand this language is accommodated to our frame of reference and the structure of our language.

Because of the Reformation, Bellarmine and the official position at the Council of Trent did harden. Because of the Protestant emphasis on scripture alone, the Catholic church at this time vehemently opposed individual interpretation which in turn reflected poorly on Galileo, making him seem a Protestant to many.  Regarding this, we can obviously lament—though I think we also must accept how important tradition is for every individual interpretation (acknowledged or not).  But the important point is that our lamentations here do not amount to “Church vs. Science.”

The fact that the Church Fathers believed in geocentrism was added as well as a nearly unbreakable witness.  And of course the reigning paradigm of Aristotelianism (which itself hardened in reaction to Protestant rejection of transubstantiation) reinforced Biblical texts that could imply a geocentric universe.  Galileo countered by noting that the Fathers did not explicitly teach geocentrism, they merely assumed it, not ever being presented with alternatives.  All of these factors were relevant.  Perhaps above all was the fact Galileo thought he had scientifically proven his point, while Bellarmine and others did not.  It is on this point that the readings of scripture turned.[7]

The obvious question needs to be asked then: didn’t Galileo prove the earth moved around the sun?  Since our time is now brief the answer has to be on all accounts: no.  Of course, he ended up being right, though not always for the right reasons (what he thought was his strongest argument, the movement of the tides indicating the sloshing of the earth in motion, turned out to be completely wrong).  And, to be sure, he had many fantastic arguments against Aristotelianism, but this is not the same as proving heliocentrism, which still had a number of strong arguments against it.  For one, if the earth moved, many reasoned, why do the stars not display parallax (that is, the apparent shift of position of a star against background objects).  The only reason we would not see parallax from a moving earth was if the universe was many orders of magnitude larger than all sides agreed upon (we must remember the size of the universe was not at issue until much later).  By Galileo’s own estimation of the size of the universe, parallax should have been visible.  And we have to remember the above quote: it was Galileo who placed the burden of absolute certainty upon himself before scriptural interpretation would change!

Heliocentrism as a scientific hypothesis for Galileo was really more of a cluster of aesthetic intuitions and anti-Aristotelian arguments held together by assertion and the force of Galileo’s wit.  It never rose to the level of proof.[8]  In a famous article “Crisis or Aesthetic,” Owen Gingerich (the same man who proved the existence of a wide network of scholars who had read Copernicus) argues against Thomas Kuhn[9] that (at least in this case) scientific theories do not, in fact, face “crises” as they transition into new theories, but are rather the assertion of a new intuition or aesthetic sense.[10] 

Gingrich contests the long-held story that the transition to heliocentrism happened in part because the Ptolemaic system began to falter under the increasing complexity needed to maintain its predictive accuracy.[11]  This is in fact not the case, and Gingerich argues that for any given prediction we would be hard pressed to discern the difference in accuracy between the Ptolemaic and Copernican systems.[12]  Copernicus in fact mainly asserted heliocentrism because he thought it produced a more beautiful and harmonious system (for example, having the earth rotate on its axis in a twenty-four hour period, rather than the entire universe), and so displayed God’s glory better—as such Copernicanism, far from being opposed to the Church at the time, was built on fundamentally theological premises!

Moreover, Galileo is sometimes painted as an empiricist over and against a Church that refuses to “see things as they are” (remember the inscription on the column next to the Villa de Medici, where Galileo is condemned “because he saw” what the Church did not).  It is true that through his telescope (which he contrary to some legends, did not invent, though he did improve) he did see many things that contradicted the Ptolemaic (and Aristotelian) systems.  For example the heavens for Aristotle were, from the moon and beyond, supposed to be immutable and perfect.  However, Galileo clearly saw craters and pocks on the moons surface through his newly crafted lenses, refuting this notion (and, in addition, putting to one side the objection that the earth as rocky and bulky, could not move—as the moon clearly moved through the sky and yet now was understood as made of the same stuff as the earth).  He saw moons around Jupiter, proving our moon was not alone in rotating around a non-central body (an “ugly and ad hoc hypothesis” according to Galileo’s critics).[13]  Most decisively, he observed Venus as a full disk in the night sky, which by the accounts of the Ptolemaic system should never be possible.

Nonetheless, as we close here, three brief things must be mentioned.  The first is that tales of Galileo doing experiments have been proven to be false, or at least incredibly dubious based on historical evidence.[14]  That Galileo did thought experiments to demonstrate his position is surely correct—but in this he is following the method of his Medieval predecessors.[15]  The second point will again seem strange to us, nonetheless it must be emphasized in order to bring out the character of the real nature of the conflict.  We think of Galileo as a defender of common sense against the Church who was so stubborn and ignorant as to think they could suppress through injunction what one could plainly see through the telescope.  But the fact is that Galileo was the one who was attempting to overturn common sense and pry it apart from reasoned argument. Galileo was not relying on experience against the church, so much as creating an entirely new theoretical framework in which to see common sense observation; so that when we see “the sun rise and set” or when we drop a stone from a tower and it does not land four-hundred feet away as we might expect if the earth itself moved,[16] these are not automatically observational refutations of heliocentrism. [17]

Moreover, not only did Galileo’s telescopic observations not prove heliocentrism by any stretch of the imagination, Galileo was—we do well to remember—asking us to trust observation through an instrument over observation by sense alone.  When we think of Galileo’s telescope, we may be imparting images of our own modern giant observatories, or even modern personal telescopes.  But such precision was unheard of in Galileo’s day—where many professional astronomers across Europe with aid of Galileo’s personal telescope could not duplicate his findings.  Johannes Kepler’s pupil, with the funny name of Horky, wrote on the 24th and 25th of April 1610 for example that Galileo had taken his own personal telescope to the house of the astronomer Magini of Bologna to demonstrate to twenty-four professors in attendance: “I never slept on the 24th or 25th of April,” writes an almost breathless Horky:

But I tested the instrument of Galileo in a thousand ways, both on things here below and on those above.  Below it works wonderfully [emphasis added]; in the heavens it deceives [emphasis added] … as some fixed stars are seen as double.  I have as witnesses most excellent men and noble doctors … and all have admitted the instrument to deceive … This silenced Galileo and on the 26th he sadly left quite early in the morning … not even thanking Magini for the splendid meal.[18]

Magini himself, writing a letter to Kepler, added regarding the occasion at his abode:

He [Galileo] has achieved nothing; for more than twenty learned men were present yet nobody has seen the new planets distinctly; he [Galileo] will hardly be able to keep them.[19]

Then Kepler himself—the great champion of heliocentrism!—sent a letter to Galileo that must have stung deeply: “I do not want to hide it from you that quite a few Italians have sent letters to Prague asserting that they could not see those stars [the moons of Jupiter] with your own telescope.”[20]  Later, in his Optics, Kepler in fact uses naked eye observations against Galileo’s telescope: “It seemed [as I looked through Galileo’s telescope] that something seemed to be missing on the outermost periphery [of the moon],”[21] as the telescope seemed to warp and smooth the outermost edges of observation.

If replication of results was a sign of good science, Galileo’s was not necessarily of that sort.



[1] One of the most measured introductions remains Edward Peters, Inquisition (New York: The Free Press, 1988).
[2] Lindberg, “Galileo, The Church, And the Cosmos,” 50.
[3] Richard Blackwell, “Galileo Galilei,” in Science & Religion, 108.
[4] John Hedley Brooke, Science and Religion: Some Historical Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 110-158; Peter Harrison, The Bible, Protestantism, and the Rise of Natural Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1998), 64-121.
[5] For Bellarmine’s statement cf. “Cardinal R. Bellarmine to P. Foscarini, 12 April 1615” in Maurice Finocchiaro, ed., The Galileo Affair: A Documentary History (California: University of California Press, 1989), 68; for Galileo’s statement, cf. Galileo “Letter to the Grand Duchess Christina (1615)” in Finocchiaro, The Galileo Affair, 101-102.
[6] For this example cf. John Walton, The Lost World of Adam and Eve: Genesis 2-3 and the Human Origins Debate (Illinois: InterVarsity Press, 2015), 201.
[7] Cf. Howell, God’s Two Books, 209-227.
[8] Lindberg, “Galileo, the Church, and the Cosmos,” 43: “So Galileo had arguments, rather than proof.”
[9] Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 3rd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).
[10] Owen Gingerich, “Crisis versus Aesthetic in the Copernican Revolution,” Vistas in Astronomy 17:1 (1975): 85-95.  Not just against Kuhn, Gingerich’s theory is also an interesting counterpoint to the otherwise excellent work of George Steiner, Real Presences (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 76 who contrasts scientific with aesthetic theory.  Steiner writes “no interpretive critical analysis, doctrine, or program is superseded, is erased, by any later construction,” but in science it is otherwise: “in Copernicanism they did and correct that of Ptolemy.”  In this sense this is to Steiner’s benefit, as his general thesis regarding the aesthetic nature of the humanities revealing God can to this extent be also extended to the sciences.
[11] Cf. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 69.
[12] Gingerich, “Crisis versus Aesthetic,” 89.
[13] Lindberg, “Galileo, The Church, and the Cosmos,” 42.
[14] Cf. John L. Heilbron, “Myth 5: That Galileo Publicly Refuted Aristotle’s  Conclusions About Motion By Repeated Experiments Made From the Campinile of Pisa,” in Newton’s Apple and Other Myths About Science, 40-47.
[15] Funkenstein, Theology and the Scientific Imagination, 152-179.
[16] The tower argument against a moving platform of earth can be found in Aristotle, De Caelo 296b22; Ptolemy, Syntaxis i.8.
[17] See the lengthy but absolutely fantastic discussion of Galileo and Copernicus in relation to general scientific method in Paul Feyerabend, Against Method (London: Verso, 2010), 61-147.
[18] Quoted in Feyerabend, Against Method, 85.
[19] Quoted in Ibid.
[20] Quoted in Ibid.
[21] Quoted in Ibid., 89.

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