God from the Syllogism
As some of you know, my first real stints into the world of "academic" theology (and here I use that term somewhat broadly) was due to attending a fairly anti-Christian highschool. While I never really considered "intellectual" survival to be the key of my faith (though, in the opposite manner, I never considered it displaceable) at the same time, due to the very specific anti-Christian fervor which abounded, mostly in the form of armchair scientism and fairly straightforward cases of logical positivism, or the more interesting varieties of relativism and an almost Marxist reading of history by the several history teachers we had there, Christian apologetics began to have a very specific appeal to me. I was soon enmeshed in a world of writing previously unknown to me. The very first book on apologetics I read (and I say this with some regret) was Gregory Boyd's Letters to a Skeptic, in which Dr. Boyd recorded a series of correspondences with his Athiest/Agnostic Father, covering a fairly standard range of Apologetic topics like theodicy, and the bogeyman that is evolution. From there, reading the classics like C.S. Lewis' various works (Mere Christianity, Miracles, The Problem of Pain, etc...) and more contemporary (and less classic) works by Norman Geisler, Josh McDowell, J.P. Moreland, William Lane Craig and the like. And while I feel that, for the most part, their apologetics were based on spurious theologies (though obviously I do not find myself in total disagreement in any given area with them) I admire all of them as thinkers, and as men who inspired me to delve deeper into problems of faith and belief. Every once and awhile, I like to go back and look over some of their conclusions, and, since I haven't posted in a while, thought I would post Alvin Plantinga's Ontological argument. Now, I for one have never been convinced even remotely by the "Ontological" strains of the argument for God's existence (and have a tendency to find sympathies with Arthur Schopenhauer when he notes it as a "charming joke"), but Plantinga's use of modal logic and the "possible world" terminology is at the very least an interesting attempt at a problem that was first classically expressed by Anselm's "a being greater than which none might be thought" argument (though of course Barth's famous-and controversial- conclusion about the Proslogion of Anselm's is that it is not, in fact, an argument remoto fidei that leads to faith, but an "argument" from within faith). At any rate, here it goes. Any comments are welcome:
I.)It is possible (i.e. not logically contradictory) that a maximally great being exists ("Maximally Great Being" = a being with all perfections and which exists by the necessity of its own perfection).
II.)If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, a maximally great being exists in a possible world.
III.)If a maximally great being exists in a possible world, by definition a maximally great being exists in all possible worlds. (i.e. because, in Plantinga's definition, a maximally great being, to posess maximal greatness, would have to be maximally great in any possible worlds, or else it would only be contingently, quasi-maximally great)
IV.)The actual world is a possible world.
V.) Therefore a maximally great being exists in the actual world.
VI.)If the maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being actually exists
VII.) A maximally great being would be known as God
VIII.)Therefore God exists in the actual world.
And boom. The world repents for its ignorance.
I.)It is possible (i.e. not logically contradictory) that a maximally great being exists ("Maximally Great Being" = a being with all perfections and which exists by the necessity of its own perfection).
II.)If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, a maximally great being exists in a possible world.
III.)If a maximally great being exists in a possible world, by definition a maximally great being exists in all possible worlds. (i.e. because, in Plantinga's definition, a maximally great being, to posess maximal greatness, would have to be maximally great in any possible worlds, or else it would only be contingently, quasi-maximally great)
IV.)The actual world is a possible world.
V.) Therefore a maximally great being exists in the actual world.
VI.)If the maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being actually exists
VII.) A maximally great being would be known as God
VIII.)Therefore God exists in the actual world.
And boom. The world repents for its ignorance.
Comments
I am curious: how does Plantinga affirm the antecedent on premise II. It seems, as the argument stands, that he is affirming the consequent - hence a fallacy of hypothetical clauses because P (antecedent) is necessary for the truth of Q (consequent). By affirming the consequent, it leaves the reader wandering if the antecedent is true.
Consequently, the argument presupposes what it sets out to defend - namely, the existence of God.
What are your thoughts?
Good question. Obviously there is little need to mention how different methodological questions can be, even among the more conservative apologists (e.g. there is "Classical," "Reformed," "Evidential," "Presuppositional," "Cumulative Case," etc...) and so what we have here is an attempt to ground the "Named God," YWHW or "The One who rescued Israel from Egypt...and the one who raised Jesus from the dead," via arguments and logic that attempt to deduce the minimum requirements for any "being" that could potentially be a candidate for the "God," category.
I think that there should be a qualification that this type of "abstract" philosophical thinking does not necessarily ground and control more "biblical," theology (e.g. in Pannenberg it, I would argue, does not) nonetheless here I believe that with apologetic arguments such as this, and the Kalaam (and the Thomistic) cosmological arguments presuppose and/or "discover" certain conditions for God that are not necessarily congenial to the God of the bible, and then, when coupled to a more "foundationalist" epistemological enterprise, can overshadow theology with questionable categories (e.g. the now well-rehearsed, and somewhat overplayed "Augustinian" legacy of abstracting the Trinity from the economy of salvation, which Colin Gunton and Catherine LaCugna were so upset about, or the "Greek" philosophical timelessness that Robert Jenson is fairly adamantly against, or God as the "First Cause," who is a "Single Subject," and the "highest essence" that Pannenberg, Moltmann, Zizioulas, Jungel, Barth, Allan Lewis, etc... all rally against).
I find these so called "proofs," irritating most of all, because while I grant there needs to be some sort of extra-biblical category for God for it to makes sense for a non-Jew and/or non-Christian to understand "YWHW is God" (e.g. YWHW = Elohim) or "Jesus is God," I nonetheless find them to overtly support a non-Trinitarian, Immaterial (timeless) substance, First Cause (e.g. non-eschatological) God that has a lot of difficulty "introducing" Trinitarian, "true infinite," and eschatological categories a posteriori after this "nameless" monotheistic god has been "discovered." While I disagree with Moltmann's polemical turning of "trinitarianism," against "monotheism," nonetheless I am growing somewhat suspicious of those who champion other monotheistic religions as part of the same "category" as Christianity, because, while they may share affinities in definitions, these definitions in Christianity ultimately are controlled by the economy of Jesus through the Spirit in relation to the Father. In much the same way these proofs rehearse Rahner's now axiomatic criticism of seperating the treatises "On the One God," from "On the Triune God," especially since Aquinas.
So all this long-windedness can essentially answer your question in a sentece: Yes, I think it is very important that God is not named in this proof, and I beleive that the "proofs," ultimately suffer because of questionable methodological and theological relationships to the God of the Bible.
@Tucker:
Another good question! First, there are slight differences between the more "straightforward" logical syllogism P-->Q (i.e. modus ponens) because what we are dealing with here is "modal" logic that doesn't deal straightaway with "if...then" constructions, but rather with possibilites and probablities (generally called "modalities," hence "modal logic.")
A proposition (e.g. "A Maximally Great Being Exists, which I suppose we can call "B" for being) is said to be modally "possible," if it is not-necessarily false, (e.g. a priori false, like a square circle), regardless of whether or not it is "actually true." What Plantinga does then in premise 1. is to state that it is possible that B (in symbolic logic this would be written as MB (M= possible, and B is forour Maximally great being)). Obviously he did a lot of groundwork elsewhere to show that B is not logically impossible (e.g. it is not impossible for a being to be omnipresent, infinite, etc...) Hence premise 2 states if MB (which 1 asserts as true) then B exists in a possible world. This is not so much a syllogism that builds logically on itself, so much as it draws out the implications of saying that MB is possible. Because if it is possible (i.e. not necessarily false) that B exists, this is essentially identical to saying that B exists in a possible world. It is simply changing the form of the expression to continue forward.
Plantinga then goes on in 3 to again simply draw out the implications. If MB, that is, if it is possible (not-necessarily false) that B, then B, by definition, must exist in all possible worlds. If it didn't it wouldn't be "B," the way Plantinga defined "B" (i.e. a Being of Maximal greatness, which implies maximal greatness in any possible world) and hence necessarily false. But since B is not necessarily false, i.e. it is possible, its possibility relates itself to all possible worlds, that is, B must be maximall great in all possible worlds. Hence the possibility of B exists in all possible worlds.
Where Plantinga loses me is in IV. I disagree that the actual world is a possible world, this seems to blur very basic distinctions in modal logic (though I have to admit I have not read Plantinga's extended work on this ontological argument, only essays, so he may address it elsewhere.) Despite his fancy modal logic footwork, I think Plantinga ultimately goes back to the point where all Ontological arguments lose me, namely attempting to define God into existence.
Indeed, Modal Logic attempts to delineate between necessary and possible truths. But what causes me consternation is that the argument wants to predicate the existence of God. Hence, it needs some sort of verb for this predication. Therefore, I question its second premise because it relies upon the necessity of the first - which is tautologous to saying that the first premise presumes its truth value. (I am aware that I am barking up Modal Logic's tree, but what I am attempting to demonsrate is that it is easily as possible to say that "it is possible that God does not exist.")To orchastrate this arugment in the confines of modal logic leaves its results, at best, only a possible conclusion. (I hope you are sensing that I am raising questions against Modal Logic, as well as the Ontological Argument. huh?)
JT
Are we starting Josephus on Monday?
JT
Sorry I hadn't checked the post sooner! Yes we are starting Josephus on Monday, and Dr. Kutz assured us that it will be somewhat easier to translate than Philo, so we will have to see. See you Monday!